Sunday, April 8, 2012 — Bad News from Timbuktu

I have a per­son­al inter­est in Tim­buk­tu (see blog for Mar 7, 2006), so I have fol­lowed, as best as I can, the recent events in Mali that affect it. After the fall of Gaddafi’s regime, sev­er­al hun­dred young Tuareg who had been serv­ing as mer­ce­nar­ies in his army have returned to Niger and Mali. Along with them came a large stock of weapons. This re-ignit­ed the low-lev­el civ­il war which had come to an appar­ent­ly sat­is­fac­to­ry peace set­tle­ment in 2009. Dis­at­is­fac­tion with the response to this renew­al of vio­lence seems to have trig­gered a coup d’état by the country’s mil­i­tary against the demo­c­ra­t­i­cal­ly elect­ed gov­ern­ment. As a con­se­quence of the insta­bil­i­ty fol­low­ing the coup, the “Nation­al Move­ment for the Lib­er­a­tion of Aza­wad” (MNLA) quick­ly occu­pied the three largest north­ern towns (Gao, Tim­buk­tu and Kidal) and declared an inde­pen­dent state of Aza­wad, cleav­ing away the thin­ly pop­u­lat­ed north­ern half of Mali.

Few events in the last few years have depressed me as much. Mali had lift­ed itself by its boot­straps from an intense­ly repres­sive Marx­ist dic­ta­tor­ship, heav­i­ly involved in the slave trade, to become West Africa’s most promis­ing democ­ra­cy. Now that promise is evaporating.

The pop­u­la­tion of Tim­buk­tu is over­whelm­ing­ly eth­nic Song­hai (unre­lat­ed lin­guis­ti­cal­ly or eth­ni­cal­ly to the Tuareg). There was once a sub­stan­tial Tuareg minor­i­ty in the city, but most left dur­ing the civ­il war. The Bam­bara, the prin­ci­ple eth­nic group of Mali, inhab­it the far south, and were nev­er present in Tim­buk­tu in sig­nif­i­cant num­ber. Ali Far­ka Touré (1939–2006), the gui­tar play­er of genius, and per­haps the kind­est and most humane fig­ure of the region, was of eth­ni­cal­ly mixed parent­age, and per­formed in both the Song­hai and Tuareg lan­guages, as well as French. As the uncor­rupt­able may­or of his native vil­lage, as well as an inter­na­tion­al­ly renowned artist, he was the liv­ing sym­bol of peace, inter-eth­nic col­lab­o­ra­tion, and democ­ra­cy in Mali. He was at the heart of the extra­or­di­nary musi­cal renais­sance that emerged in Mali, hand in hand with democ­ra­cy. In a way, I’m glad that he died with­out hav­ing to wit­ness this dev­as­tat­ing rever­sal of his life work.

The Tuareg in Mali have def­i­nite­ly legit­i­mate griev­ances (there were abus­es by the army dur­ing the civ­il war), but their sit­u­a­tion has nev­er been com­pa­ra­ble to what it has been in neigh­bour­ing Niger. The renew­al of fight­ing has more to do with very un-tra­di­tion­al Tuareg youth, de-cul­tur­al­ized, recruit­ed into var­i­ous armies and then cast loose look­ing for some­thing vio­lent to do, and with ambi­tious men look­ing for a new ide­o­log­i­cal pow­er base on which to build their lit­tle empire. Many are cast-offs from Gaddafi’s thug army. The MNLA, how­ev­er, is not nec­es­sar­i­ly in charge of its own rebel­lion. It has been increas­ing­ly forced to rely on an expe­di­ent alliance with the dan­ger­ous Islamist group Ançar Dine, which has con­nec­tions to Al-Qae­da. This group has no motives (oth­er than oppor­tunism) that have any­thing to do with the peo­ple of north­ern Mali, or Tuareg or Song­hai cul­ture. They are dan­ger­ous fanat­ics. I sus­pect very strong­ly that they have already side­lined the orig­i­nal lead­er­ship of the MNLA (which is based in Gao), and are the ones who real­ly con­trol Tim­buk­tu. What­ev­er their aims, the MNLA are demon­stra­bly idiots for con­nect­ing them­selves to them. They will soon learn that they have reaped the whirlwind.

Tuareg soci­ety is not a ready fit for the ide­o­log­i­cal Islamist move­ment. It is Tuareg males, not females, who tra­di­tion­al­ly cov­er their faces with a veil, and women have nev­er been con­signed to par­tic­u­lar­ly sub­servient posi­tion. Both Tuareg and Song­hai soci­eties are noth­ing like the kind of plea­sure-hat­ing, fanat­i­cal self-hatred and bar­barism that lies at the heart of the Islamist move­ment. But Ançar Dine’s pow­er base is not sup­port from any local peo­ple, whether Tuareg or Song­hai, but the cash and ide­o­log­i­cal zealotry of an inter­na­tion­al move­ment. Their leader, Iyad Ag Ghaly, is a psy­cho­log­i­cal­ly typ­i­cal fraud: once well known for booz­ing and par­ty­ing, he grew a beard and cosied up to jihadists while assigned by the Malian gov­ern­ment as a diplo­mat to Sau­di Ara­bia. You can be sure that the piety is phony. 

You can also be sure that the peo­ple of Tim­buk­tu are about to suf­fer. So will the cause of African democracy. 

I also, under­standibly, fear for the wealth of learn­ing that might be destroyed. There are many thou­sands of books pre­served there. The library of Sanko­ré Uni­ver­si­ty in Tim­buk­tu was a great repos­i­to­ry of books for cen­turies. It was found­ed in 988 AD with an endow­ment by a wealthy Tuareg woman, who want­ed the city to have a seat of learn­ing on par with the great urban cen­ters of Islam. There were also many pri­vate libraries. Tim­buk­tu was a major cen­ter of the Islam­ic book trade, often tak­ing pay­ment for exports in books. When the French con­quered it, many lead­ing fam­i­lies were afraid that the books would be stolen and cart­ed off to Paris, so much of the col­lec­tion was split up and hid­den, with respon­si­ble fam­i­lies know­ing the hid­ing places. I saw only a small sam­ple of the huge total — they includ­ed many reli­gious texts, of course, but also works on geog­ra­phy, chem­istry, med­i­cine, astron­o­my, and his­to­ry. Among them are indige­nous West African works and chron­i­cles. The vast major­i­ty of these works have not been trans­lat­ed, and are only begin­ning to be cat­a­logued and assessed. I pre­sume this process has come to a halt, under the cur­rent polit­i­cal circumstances.

The new rulers of Tim­buk­tu are not like­ly to have much inter­est in, or sym­pa­thy, with this glo­ri­ous heritage.

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