I looked forward to reading this book, which had been recommended to me. But it proved a disappointment. Occasionally, it lapses into common sense for a page or two, but for the most part it’s an exercise in regurgitating the tedious orthodoxies of our time. Plenty of Foucault. Plenty of nebulous and de-humanized passages like “Political violence may have lacked systematicity because jurisdictions conflicted, but it retained an overall coherence through its techniques. These techniques involved the inscription of signs, and it is therefore not surprising that the violence about penal rituals involved the misrepresentation of signs….The brigand in this instance used punishments as a technique or representation. He did not obliterate the system of representations; he merely playfully changed what the signs meant.” That is how the author chooses to describe somebody having nails hammered into his feet. We learn that “the encarcerated become subject to a hermeneutics of suspicion”, and so on.
This kind of pedantic trivialization is taught to undergraduates in our universities, who are made to produce millions of pages of jargon-filled, syrupy exegisis applied to anything and everything: the sociology of fashion runway shows, the “discourse” of airport waiting lounges, the baking of blueberry muffins, etc. Applying this kind of stuff to a subject like torture merely wastes our time, when we need to be doing something to stop torture. And for heaven’s sake, when will academic ninnies stop quoting Marx? Marx is utterly worthless garbage, of no intellectual value whatsoever. The same goes for Noam Chomsky. When will these nerds ever grow up?
I’m perhaps a bit too harsh. There are some useful sections in the book. The author is sincere, and does try to tackle a difficult subject. No doubt he feels real compassion for the sufferings of torture victims, and cares about the fate of the people of Iran. But this stuff is not helping. It’s the fault of our claustrophobic and backward-looking universities, which take intelligent scholars, turn them into tiresome drones, and set them to playing inane word games.
What remains conspicuously absent from such scholarship is any understanding of human beings and their motives. On the first page, Rejani considers the possibility that torturers “do what they do voluntarily and with full knowledge of their situation, and they enjoy a feeling of excess power when they destroy another human being” ― and instantly rejects it as inadmissible, unprovable, and uninteresting. That’s the last we hear of that possibility. From then on, torturers are merely playing out abstract sociological patterns and exuding symbols. This is humbug.
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