Soraj Honglaradom, at the Philosophy department of the University of Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, has graciously allowed me to quote his e‑mail concerning the coup in Thailand:
The coup d’etat was perpetrated by a group of officers who are disatisfied with the Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, who has generated such an intense amount of controversies in Thailand as has never been experienced before. The transition process is going on smoothly and there is no violence. At the time of writing this mail, everything appears calm. The “Reform Group for Democracy under Monarchy”, as the group calls itself, has declared today (Sept.20) to be a holiday and so I am writing this from home. Many people that I know actually welcome the event, as they are fed up with the regime of the Prime Minister. From my past experiences with previous Thai coups, what will happen next is probably that the Reform Group will name an interim Prime Minister. A new charter will be drafted (the much vaunted Constitution of 1997 lasted only nine years), and finally a general election will be called. No one knows exactly when this will happen, but my guess is that we will expect a general election within a year. This is only my guess: things have a way of unravelling themselves in unexpected ways.
Mr. Saroj’s comment rings true to me. It seems to fit the other reports I’ve gotten.
The fact that Prime Minister Thaksin just happened to be the richest man in the country makes it plain that his regime was “democratic” in name only. That is not what happens in genuine democracies. It is clearly no real loss to the world democratic movement that he has been ousted, even though the precedent of military action is extremely damaging. But Thailand is still left in the position of having no real democratic infrastructure.
When we analyze the degree of democratic practice in a country, the first thing we should ask is not “is the head of state elected?” . It is more fruitful to ask “is local government the result of genuine elections, and does each higher level of authority rest on democratic underpinings on a lower level?” In a functioning democracy, a head of state gets into their role by working their way through layers of public service, until they have proven themself responsible to larger and larger electorates. The most successful national democracies were built on foundations of democratic process on the local level. It is not a “top-down” process. This is why America’s plans to conquer countries and scream declarations of democracy at them are doomed to failure.
It is an underlying web of democratic practice that distinguishes politics in a functioning democracy from the kind of puppet show where a powerful general, gangster, or billionaire is simply handed the mantle of power, and then redistributes loot and privileges to his cronies. The democratic infrastructure does not make corruption impossible, but it tames and limits it. Thus, for example, Canada’s Prime Minister lost the leadership of his party, and his reputation, when he was caught in some corrupt transactions that someone like Thaksin would consider insignificant pocket change. Thaksin was subject to no such limitations. The electoral process gave him a blank check with which to exercise power at whim. My guess is that Thaksin understood his position as Prime Minister as being nothing but an extension of his business empire, adding chaimanship of Thailand, Inc., to his list of corporate directorships.
The existence of such shell democracies or mock democracies is more of a hindrance to evolving functioning democracies than outright dictatorship. With a crude dictatorship, the problem and the alternative are clear. With shell democracies, ordinary people are left with the impression that this kind of “big man” autocracy is what the word “democracy” is supposed to mean, and so the idea of democracy itself falls into disrepute.
We have been struggling with this problem for two centuries, now. But eventually, the real dynamics of the process will become general knowledge.
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