14856. (Robert Smith Thompson) Empires On the Pacific ― World War II and the Struggle for the Mastery of Asia

This out­line of the mil­i­tary and diplo­matic his­tory of the Pacif­ic the­atre of WWII is of mixed val­ue. In describ­ing the oper­a­tions of Amer­i­can forces, it is quite good. Thomp­son describes the main bat­tles in lit­tle vignettes, which are well-cho­sen and well-writ­ten. But some of the book touch­es on Chi­na, and in these parts, he depends heav­ily on the dis­cred­ited and gen­er­ally worth­less reportage of Edgar Snow, per­pet­u­at­ing myths man­u­fac­tured by the Com­mu­nist Par­ty. Thomp­son believes, like many peo­ple once did, that if only Wash­ing­ton had struck a deal with Mao, they would have built a fruit­ful rela­tion­ship with him. This is non­sense. Thomp­son is quite right that Gen­eral Stillwell’s eval­u­a­tion of Chi­ang Kaishek was basi­cally cor­rect. Chi­ang was insuf­fer­ably cor­rupt, and made lit­tle seri­ous effort to resist the Japan­ese, doing only the bare min­i­mum that would ensure the flow of aid. How­ever, if the Nation­al­ists under Chi­ang did lit­tle to fight the Japan­ese, the Com­mu­nists under Mao did absolute­ly noth­ing. Mao not only had no inter­est in fight­ing the Japan­ese, he had been hop­ing the Japan­ese would destroy Chi­ang and occu­py a large part of the coun­try, which would leave the rest of the coun­try in his hands and force Stal­in to acknowl­edge his per­ma­nent pow­er. In fact, the Com­mu­nists’ only known armed exchange with the Japan­ese was an acci­den­tal skir­mish, which aroused Mao’s fury. He would have entered into a pact with the Japan­ese the sec­ond it was possible.

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